**Schedule EXTRA Workshop.1**

@ Ruhr University Bochum, Veranstaltungszentrum (Convention Centre), Saal 4 (Hall 4)

**Monday, May 13, 2019**

10:30 – 12:00  
Edouard Machery:  
*Dogmatism and Parochialism*  
**LUNCH @ BECKMANNNS HOF**

13:30 – 15:00  
Herman Cappelen:  
*Philosophy is Perfect – A Reply to the Flagellants*  
**COFFEE BREAK**

15:30 – 17:00  
Joachim Horvath:  
*Mischaracterization Reconsidered*  
**COFFEE BREAK**

17:30 – 19:00  
Jennifer Nado:  
*The Myth of the Method of Cases*  
**INFORMAL DINNER @ Q-WEST**

**Tuesday, May 14, 2019**

10:00 – 11:30  
Michael Strevens:  
*Why Some Folk Don’t Get Gettier*  
**COFFEE BREAK**

11:45 – 13:15  
Adriano Angelucci:  
*On Giving Arguments for Cases. A Levels-based Proposal*  
**LUNCH @ MENSA**

14:30 – 16:00  
Pascale Willemsen:  
*Don’t Chmess with Me! – Why Moral Philosophy Needs Moral Psychology*  
**COFFEE BREAK**

16:30 – 18:00  
Steffen Koch, Alex Wiegmann, & Joachim Horvath:  
*Experimental work in progress on intuitive expertise and meaning change*  
**CONFERENCE DINNER @ POST’S LOTTENTAL**
Abstracts

Herman Cappelen: *Philosophy is Perfect: A reply to the Flagellants*
The aim of the paper is to show that metaphilosophical criticism of standard philosophical methodology are bound to fail. Such criticism are internally inconsistent because they use standard philosophical methodology to argue against standard philosophical methodology. I illustrate this using recent work by A. Baz and E. Machery. Building on this insight, I show that there can be no philosophical argument against philosophical methodology. I then use that to show that there can be no argument against philosophical methodology. Finally I say a bit about what this tells us about philosophical methodology.

Jennifer Nado: *The Myth of the Method of Cases*
Recently, characterizations of the standard method of philosophy that invoke reliance on intuition have come under question. Increasingly, philosophers are now characterizing philosophical inquiry as merely relying on 'judgments' rather than intuitions, and/or as primarily employing argumentation rather than brute appeal to the self-evident. Yet philosophers who move away from 'intuition' often retain a picture of philosophical inquiry upon which it centrally relies on 'cases'. Traditional ideas of the 'method of cases' portray it as involving use of intuition; can it be understood in an intuition-neutral manner? I'll explore a few different ways of characterizing the method of cases, arguing that none particularly accurately portray current practices of philosophical inquiry. I conclude that the role of reliance on cases has been dramatically overblown in recent philosophers’ methodological self-conception. It’s this, much more than the supposed 'myth' of reliance on intuition, that constitutes our most common metaphilosophical misunderstanding.

Michael Strevens: *Why Some Folk Don’t Get Gettier*
Experimental philosophers have shown that many ordinary people count cases of Gettierized justified true belief as instances of knowledge. Building on some remarks in my recent book on armchair philosophy, I will attempt to explain why this is so, in a way that does not undermine philosophical analysts’ own judgments about these cases.

Adriano Angelucci: *On Giving Arguments for Cases. A Levels-Based Proposal*
A traditional practice in epistemology – that I call P – consists in appealing to cases in theorizing. Contrary to what normally happens with other claims appealed to in theorizing – e.g. ordinary perceptual claims – epistemologists often argue for their claims about cases, they provide reasons for accepting their truth. A descriptively adequate account of P ought to make room for this phenomenon and explain why it takes place at all. According to a recent view, the fact that epistemologists argue for the relevant claims would be best explained by supposing that they take those arguments to be what ultimately justifies their corresponding beliefs. I argue that this view, while deserving credit for having acknowledged a crucial aspect of P, is at odds with epistemologists’ actual practice, and propose a more adequate explanation of the phenomenon at issue, which turns on carefully distinguishing epistemic levels when addressing issues related to P’s epistemology.

Joachim Horvath: *Mischaracterization Reconsidered*
According to the mischaracterization charge by Max Deutsch and Herman Cappelen, philosophers do not use case intuitions as evidence for judgments about hypothetical cases, but instead *argue* for them. The reception of the mischaracterization charge has been largely negative, despite the fact that Deutsch and Cappelen present numerous case studies that support their charge. In this paper, I argue that most of the extant objections to the mischaracterization charge are unconvincing. In the second, more tentative part, I explore some replies to the mischaracterization charge that might be more promising.